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Aquinas’ concept of change 
and its consequences for corporeal creatures
wybieraj póki czas
wybieraj na co czekasz
wybieraj
(Z. Herbert, Trzy studia na temat realizmu)
This paper is a presentation of Aquinas’ concept of change (lat. mu-
tatio) and its consequences for corporeal creatures (lat. creatura corpo-
rali). Within Thomas’ philosophy, it can be proved that creatures are 
sentenced to unceasing change and cannot stop changing. That’s why 
the very purpose of change  –  full actualisation  –  is never attainable. 
Creatures are imperfect beings, and ex sui natura cannot attain perfec-
tion. Such a vision can lead to a conviction that the world of corporeal 
creatures is absurd. A short solution to the problem of absurdity is given 
with the use of Aquinas’ concept of participation.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first section some 
basic limitations for the sake of this paper are made. In the second the 
concept of corporeal creatures is outlined. The third section analyses the 
definition of change. The fourth one presents various kinds of change. 
The next three are, respectively, proof of the creatures’ unceasing change, 
impossibility of full actualisation, and imperfection. The last one is an 
abbreviated presentation of the concept of participation as a reply to the 
question of the world’s absurdity.
The limitations of the paper
According to Saint Thomas, change is one of the subjects of natural 
science; it is its obiectus formali. This idea is derived from Aristotle and 
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was well-known among mediaeval philosophers. Aquinas says: „Natural 
science studies natural things, things with an interior tendency to move 
and change”1.
In this paper we only concentrate on physical changes, which means 
that we exclude immaterial things from our considerations: „But, as 
Aristotle says, wherever there is change there must be material change. 
So natural science is concerned with material, changing things”2.
The conceptions of change and matter are considered within natural 
science (lat. Scientia Naturali, Philosophia Naturali, Physica): „Et quia 
omne, quod habet materiam mobile est, consequens est, quod ens mo-
bile sit subiectum Naturalis Philosophiae”3.
Thus, anything that consists of matter changes (moves) and, in con-
sequence, everything that changes is a subject of natural science. There-
fore, we do not consider here such „changes” as creation, transmuta-
tion and annihilation. In sensu stricto, they are not changes, because: 
„For what is made by motion or by change is made from something 
pre-existing”4. Hence, for example, creation is not a real change, since 
it is creatio ex nihilo and requires neither matter, nor the existence of 
anything. It is necessary that: „Hence, when God creates, He produces 
things without motion”5. And further: „To create is, properly speaking, 
to cause or produce the being of things”6.
The word „change” in Aquinas’ philosophy has an extensive mean-
ing and is sometimes ambiguous. It is both a metaphysical and a physi-
cal expression. It refers, de facto, to everything which is not God7. That 
is why in this paper we need to make some limitations and restrict our 
1 Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, Q.5, art.2, [in:] Selected 
philosophical writings: Thomas Aquinas, ed. T. McDermott, Oxford 1993, p. 14.
2 Ibid., Q. 5, art. 2, p. 14.
3 Idem, In octo libros de phisico auditu sive physicorum Aristotelis. Commentaria, Lib. I, 
cap. 1, Napoli 1953, p. 14.
4 Idem, Summa theologica, Q. XLV, art. 3, [in:] Basic writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
ed. A. C. Pegis, vol. 1, Indianapolis–Cambridge 1997, p. 437.
5 Ibid., Q. XLV, art. 3, p. 437.
6 Ibid., Q. XLV, art. 6, p. 442.
7 See idem, Expositio…, Q. V, art. 2, op. cit., p. 13.
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research to physical, material changes which are related to the so-called 
corporeal creatures.
Description of corporeal creatures
Since we are considering natural things, we are considering crea-
tures. Creatures are products of nature8. Creatures are entities which 
are being created, which are in the process of creation: „The creature is 
the term of creation as signifying change […] is it necessary to say that 
a creature is being created during its entire existence”9;
Creatures are being created continually in the process of change. 
Nevertheless, they cannot create themselves, because nothing can cre-
ate except for God. Contrary to Avicenna, Aquinas says: „So it is im-
possible for any creature to create, either by its own power, or instru-
mentally – that is, ministerially”10. It is so because no creature has the 
power to create being as being, God-power. Creatures can only operate 
on what has already been created, what has already been in being: „The 
operation of nature takes places only on the presupposition of created 
principles”11. The universe of creatures is called the world or the natu-
ral world12.
In this paper we want to tackle the question: what are the consequenc-
es of the definition of change for corporeal creatures? We know what crea-
tures are, but we do not yet know what corporeal creatures are. Although 
all creatures belong to the natural world, not all belong to the natural ma-
terial world. Not all creatures consist of matter. Let us see how a descrip-
tion of corporeal creatures is introduced by a Polish historian of mediae-
val philosophy – Stefan Swieżawski: „If we want to take the position that 
is enforced by experience, that is, that there is a plurality of various, real 
things, we need to, according to Saint Thomas, accept that every being is 
8 See idem, Summa…, Q. XLV, art. 8, op. cit., p. 445f.
9 Ibid. Q. XLV, art. 3, p. 438.
10 Ibid., Q. XLV, art. 5, p. 440.
11 Ibid., Q. XLV, art. 8, p. 446.
12 See ibid., Q. XLVI, art. 1, p. 447.
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composed of potentiality and actuality”13. The general thesis is a presence 
of composition of potentia et actus in everything which is created. How-
ever, this is not sufficient for describing corporeal beings, in concreto:
[…] there is a composition on two levels in corporeal creatures. The first – more 
general – composition of essence and existence, the second, within essence itself, 
composition of potentiality and actualisation […] Corporeal beings have, according 
to Saint Thomas, double composition. They are composed of essence and existence, 
and moreover their essence consists of the potentiality to be something extensive, 
this is of matter, and the actualisation of this potentiality, that is of form14.
Not everything contains matter. For example, angels are immate-
rial, although they are composed of potentiality and actuality15. This is 
Aquinas’ innovation, because classically potentiality was considered to 
be matter. The main difference between Aquinas and Avicenna is exactly 
this dilemma: whether there is a combination of matter and form in ev-
ery being16. However, we must pay attention to Thomas, and according 
to him corporeal creatures are composed not only of potentiality and ac-
tuality, essence and existence, but also of matter and form, with emphasis 
on matter. And this is their specification. To sum up, we can say that cor-
poreal creatures are entities being created continually and composed of 
a special kind of potentiality – matter – and its actualisation, form.
Definition of change
There are two most important things which describe any kind of 
change: the first is „actuality of potentiality” (gr. entelecheia), and the 
13 S. Swieżawski, Św. Tomasz na nowo odczytany, transl. M. Dziurosz, Poznań 1995, p. 44.
14 Ibid., p. 82f.
15 In Summa theologica, Thomas says: „Although there is no composition of matter and 
form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality” (Q. L, art. 2, op. cit., p. 484). 
16 See J. Goheen, The Problem of matter and form in De ente et essentia of Thomas Aqui-
nas, Harvard 1940.
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second is „by something else” (lat. ab alio). We will consider these two 
components in detail.
Thomas takes the definition of change from Aristotle, as expressed in 
his Physics: „[…] the actuality of that which potentially is, qua such, is 
change”17. The expression qua means in so far as or, simply, as. Accord-
ing to Aristotle, we talk about change when we have two things: potenti-
ality and actuality. But this does not suffice for defining change. We need 
a special kind of potentiality, as we can say, potentiality in so far as it is 
potentiality for a  certain actualisation. To have something potentially 
means to have a strong possibility for it becoming actual if everything 
goes well. We must keep in mind that potentiality is not simple possi-
bility. Possibility is „weaker” than potentiality. Potentiality is something 
that not only has a logical possibility to exist, but what exists in some 
way, but only potentially. 
Change and becoming something else are strictly connected to po-
tentiality. Thomas says: „Now everything which is in any way changed, 
is in some way in potentiality”18. The aim of change is to actualise some-
thing. However, change cannot actualise whatever just „wants to” actu-
alise, but only what is in potentiality to a certain actualisation; in other 
words, what has the potential to become actual in a certain aspect. Saint 
Thomas says in De Principis Naturae: „You can’t generate fire from any 
non-fire thing, but only from a non-fire thing open to being fire”19.
Creatures are not entities that can alter freely into any other creature. 
Their openness to change is limited to a certain scope of potentialities.
That was the first description of change. Let us see the second one: 
„Everything that is in the process of change has that change initiated in 
it by something else”20. Let us investigate what it means. As we have seen, 
17 Aristotle, Physics, Book III and IV, 201a10, transl. E. Hussey, Oxford 1993, p. 2. Other 
translations: „the fulfillment of what is potentially, as such, is motion” (Oxford translation), „the prog-
ress of realizing of potentiality, qua potentiality” (P. H. Wicksteed’s and F. M. Cornford’s translation).
18 Thomas Aquinas, Summa…, Q. IX, art. 1, op. cit., p. 70.
19 Idem, The Principle of nature, [in:] Thomas…, op. cit., p. 70.
20 Idem, The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Introductory reading, ed. Ch. Martin, Lon-
don–New York 1988, p. 60.
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change is a process - a passage from potentiality to actuality. However, ac-
tualisation is not self-actualisation: its beginning depends on something 
else. As Christopher Martin comments: „[…] nothing can change from 
potentiality to actuality except by the influence of something which is in 
actuality”21. It is important that this „something else” cannot be anything, 
but it must be something actual. This has immense consequences for the 
corporeal world. Namely: „[…] in material things it is always one part that 
initiates a change in another part. There are, then, no initiators of their 
own change in the chief or principal sense in the material world”22. Thus, 
although there are all sorts of changes in the material world, the material 
world has not enough power to initiate them. Change in the material world 
demands something „not of this world”; the material world is not sufficient 
to explain where indeed the change comes from. What is required to ex-
plain why some change in the material world really proceeds is to cite the 
efficient cause. It is so because Thomas, as Aristotle’s student, places the 
considerations about change in a schema of four causes. In the Principles 
of Natures we can read: „So besides matter and form there must be the ef-
ficient cause or mover or agent, from which the change originates”23.
Having a  complete system of four causes, we need one more 
cause – a goal. The goal is special: „[…] is called the causes of causes: 
because it causes the causality of the other causes”24. Change which is 
originated by the efficient cause is blind without its purpose. And so 
there is a need of some guide, which is the goal. And: „The final cause is 
the answer to the question «why» something exists or occurs; the agent 
or efficient cause is the maker or producer of the change; the material 
cause is that out of which the change comes; and the formal cause is the 
specifying factor in any event or existent”25.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 61.
23 Thomas Aquinas, The Principle…, op. cit., p. 72.
24 Ibid., p. 75.
25 V. J. Bourke, Thomas Aquinas, [in:] Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 9, ed. D. M. Borchert, 
Detroit–New York–San Francisco–San Diego–New Haven, Conn.  –  Waterville, Maine–London–
Munich 2006, p. 428.
179 Aquinas’ concept of change…
For a better and deeper understanding of what change is, we need to 
recognise the various types of change.
Kinds of change
According to Salamucha26, Thomas basically divides physical chang-
es into substantial (lat. substantialis) and accidental (lat. accidentalis). 
Substantial changes are divided into two: generation (lat. generatio) and 
corruption (lat. corruptio). Within accidental changes there are instant 
(lat. instantanea) and gradual (lat. successiva) changes. Accidental gen-
eration and accidental corruption belong to accidental instant changes, 
and changes: in place (lat. latio), quantitative (lat. augmentatio), qualita-
tive (lat. alteratio) belong to gradual accidental change.
In this section we would like to answer the question what these 
many kinds of changes have in common and what they are in general. 
In Summa Theologiae Thomas says: „For change means that the same 
thing should be different now from what it was previously”27. Change 
introduces a difference into a thing. The thing „after” change must be 
different. Nevertheless, we can talk about change only if this change is 
founded on the same thing. Every change needs some ground which 
will be in the process of change. So, in a changing thing we have two 
important elements: something which is the same during the process of 
change and something which is different28. And now: „Basically, prime 
matter is that which remains constant and provides continuity during 
a change from one substance to another”29. When we consider substan-
tial change, the subject of change is prime matter. When the subject of 
change is a substance, we talk about accidental change: „[…] changes 
26 See J. Salamucha, The proof ex motu for the existence of God: Logical Analysis of St. 
Thomas’ Arguments, [in:] Aquinas: A collection of critical essays, ed. A. Kenny, Notre Dame, Ind. 
1976, p. 187.
27 Thomas Aquinas, Summa…, Q. XLV, art. 2, op. cit., p. 436.
28 Here is a space for the problem of identity. What kind of change effects the loss of 
a thing’s identity and what makes the thing remain itself?
29 V. J. Bourke, Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., p. 427. 
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in which a substance is the subject, in which a substance changes as re-
gards some accident it has”30, as Martin clarifies.
During both substantial and accidental change something must be 
the subject of change. However, in substantial change this is prime mat-
ter, and in accidental -  the substance. At this point we need to recall 
Martin’s comment:
People often talk as if the accidents were that which can change, and 
the substance that which does not change: this is very alien to the man-
ner of speaking of Aristotle and Aquinas. For them, it is precisely the 
substance that changes, that is the subject of change: the accidents do 
not change at all, strictly speaking: they merely (in some sense) cease to 
exist and come into existence31.
So in fact, the subject of change changes; and in accidental change 
the substance changes, not the accidents. The accidents just appear and 
disappear. In substantial change the prime matter changes and the sub-
stances just generate and corrupt.
Now, when we have introduced all the basic elements necessary for 
our purposes, to wit, definition and types of change and description of 
corporeal creatures, we can proceed with our argumentation and pres-
ent some simple proofs of creatures’ unceasing change, unactualisability 
and imperfection.
Proof of creatures’ unceasing change
The proof of creatures’ unceasing change is trivial. Namely, if we 
combine the definition of change and statements about the construc-
tion of a corporeal creature, we will obtain proof of corporeal creatures’ 
un-cease-ability in change. Let us see how the argument runs. Since (1) 
change is defined as actualisation of potentiality, (2) corporeal creatures 
are necessarily constructed of matter, (3) having matter implies having 
potentiality, (4) there exists something which is in actuality, corporeal 
30 Ch. Martin, The Philosophy of Thomas…, op. cit., p. 65.
31 Ibid., p. 63.
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creatures must change. Whereas every corporeal creature has potential-
ity, every corporeal creature is necessarily changing, for change is tran-
sition from potentiality to actuality. In other words, due to having mat-
ter corporeal creatures are always „ready” to change, and as soon as an 
occasion occurs (as soon as they encounter something which initiates 
change) –  they will change. Corporeal creatures containing matter are 
unceasingly changeable entities, are always in disposition to change. 
Moreover, a corporeal creature – in order to be itself – must contain mat-
ter and potentiality, so it must change unceasingly. Of course, the basic 
premise for this argument is that there exists something in actuality.
We can prove this from another perspective: only what is in pure ac-
tuality and does not have anything in potency is unchangeable, and so is 
God. Everything else that has something – anything – in potency must 
change, is condemned to change. Thus corporeal creatures, necessarily 
containing matter as a kind of potentiality, always have something in po-
tentiality – they are not pure actuality. If they are not pure actuality, they 
are not unchangeable, so they are changeable. And because they must 
contain matter, they are always changeable – they change unceasingly.
Now the questions arise: is there any possibility for corporeal crea-
tures not to change? Can they stop changing? Is there no other possibil-
ity? No, because everything that is material is potential. And as long as 
something is in potentiality, it is changeable. And so corporeal creatures 
do not have an alternative – as long as they exist, they change unceas-
ingly. So Saint Thomas claims not only that if something is in change, it 
is in potentiality, but also that what is in potentiality, is in change. So, if 
anything is in any potency, it must change. And as long as creatures are 
constructed as material, they cannot stop changing. 
Proof that creatures are not fully actualisable
When we proved, in the spirit of Aquinas, corporeal creatures’ un-
ceasing change, we also proved that a corporeal creature cannot achieve 
full actualisation. Namely, if corporeal creatures achieved full actualisa-
tion, they would stop changing, since actualisation is a purpose and so 
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an end of change, but, as we have proved, they cannot stop changing; 
ergo they can never achieve full actualisation. Creatures can never be 
in full actuality, because they are in a perpetual process of change, so in 
a perpetual process of actualisation. The process of actualisation is un-
ceasing, so there is no end to it. Therefore full actualisation is unattain-
able and corporeal creatures cannot be fully actualised.
Proving this from a different angle, we can argue as follows. (1) Full 
actualisation is a lack of potentiality. (2) Each corporeal creature con-
tains matter. (3) Possessing matter implies having potentiality. There-
fore corporeal creatures are not fully actualised. As long as creatures 
are material, they are potential; as long as they are potential, they are 
not fully actual. Because they must be material, they cannot be fully 
actual, so they are unactualisable fully – they cannot achieve full actu-
alisation.
In fact, creatures change, but they never achieve the purpose of 
change  –  full actualisation  –  because they must change all the time. 
Full actualisation is something that they approach, but never attain. It 
is some kind of approximation, but not attainment. It is so because they 
cannot, as corporeal creatures, get rid of the body. The reason for this 
is that if they got rid of the body, they would not be corporeal creatures 
any more. They are always not-fully-actualised, they always lack some-
thing. One can say that creatures are insatiable – always. Ex nature they 
are condemned to attempts of achieving something that is unachievable. 
One can say that corporeal creatures are absurd. Simply, the creatures’ 
inner construction makes them absurd. The necessary content of mat-
ter as well as the necessary content of potentiality and the desire to be-
come fully actual combine together to create the absurdity of corporeal 
creatures. Corporeal creatures exist in order to attain something that is, 
because of their construction, unattainable.
Proof of the imperfection of creatures
Let us start with Aquinas’ words: „Now it is clear that a thing is desir-
able only in so far as it is perfect, for all desire their own perfection. But 
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everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing 
is perfect so far as it is being”32.
Saint Thomas associates perfection with actuality and being. In fact, 
for him perfection is identical with being and actuality. For our proof of 
creatures’ imperfection we just need to say that as long as a creature is 
corporeal, it is ipso facto in potentiality. And as long as it is in potential- 
ity, is not in actuality. As long as it is not actual, is not perfect. Q.E.D.
Proving this in a different manner, we can reason this way: because 
(1) corporeal creatures are unactualisable, as we have seen in section 6, 
and (2) perfection is actuality, corporeal creatures are unable to be per-
fect, and so they are imperfect.
On the other hand, the creatures’ imperfection is obvious, since the 
only perfect being is God: „[…] no creature perfectly represents the first 
exemplar, which is the divine essence”33;
At this point, it seems that Thomas Aquinas’ account is more similar 
to the Platonic than the Aristotelian view. This is not very surprising for 
Thomas’ whole system is founded on the perfect God. As a consequence 
of such a metaphysical vision there is nothing left for corporeal crea-
tures but a strong and unsatisfied desire for perfection: „[…] every na-
ture desires its own being and its own perfection”34. Again, we discover 
something absurd in creatures. Their insatiable desires to become per-
fect make them absurd. In the process of change, they try to reach per-
fection which they are unable to reach. All their attempts are necessarily 
unsuccessful. Corporeal creatures trying to achieve something which is 
unachievable appear to be absurd.
Now we have to ask the questions: are these three proofs also proofs 
of the absurdity of the world? And is there any way out from this sup-
posed absurdity for corporeal creatures? It seems that Thomas’ reply to 
this problem is the concept of participation.
32 Thomas Aquinas, Summa…, Q. V, art. 1, op. cit., p. 42.
33 Ibid., Q. XLVII, art. 2, p. 460.
34 Ibid., Q. XLVIII, art. 1, p. 465. 
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The concept of participation  
as a solution to the problem of the absurdity of the world
Considering the set questions, we need to bear in mind that Thomas’ 
system is holistic and understanding it fully is possible only if we ac-
quire the proper perspective. And now, the world as a whole can never 
be imperfect or absurd for Aquinas, since: „[…] the whole universe to-
gether participates in the divine goodness more perfectly, and repre-
sents it better, than any given single creature” 35 . Though particular crea-
tures are imperfect, actual only in some aspects and changeable, they do 
participate in the divine and, one can say, emergent perfection: „It is the 
part of the best cause to produce an effect which is best as a whole, but 
this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best ab-
solutely, but in proportion to the whole” 36. The concept of participation 
introduces a different perspective – more general and embracing crea-
tures from a „higher” level. However, to gain adequate understanding, 
we should interpret participation in a certain way. It seems that we can-
not understand it as H. P. Kainz proposes:
[…] „participation”, we will see that it is at the same time both an affir-
mation and a negation: an affirmation, in so far as it designates a certain 
degree of positive actuality which is possessed; but a negation, in so far 
as it implies that there is some chasm – be it relatively great or small – be-
tween the perfection of the participant and unparticipated act” 37.
It is self-evident that no creature is everything and each of them can 
only exist in a limited way – participate only in a part of the world. Nev-
ertheless this does not mean that this is something negative. We should 
not talk about participation in a category of negation. Creatures exist-
ing do not negate what they do not participate in  –  they do not ne-
gate the „unparticipated act”. It seems that Aquinas teaches us a positive 
way of thinking rather than a negative one. It is similar with God. We 
35 Ibid., Q. XLVII, art. 1, p. 459. 
36 Ibid., Q. XLVII, art. 2, p. 461. 
37 H. P. Kainz, “Active and Passive Potency” in Thomistic Angelology, The Hague 1972, p. 33. 
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cannot think about God and the world in two radically different man-
ners. It is exactly the concept of participation which was supposed to 
fill the „chasm” between one entity and another, between God and cre-
ation. The concept of participation serves as a link and a reconciliation 
between mistakenly supposed oppositions. To understand it better, it 
is advisable not to think in two categories of negation and affirmation 
(resp. potentiality and actuality, possibility and reality). It seems that if 
we understand creation as an opposition to the perfect God, we will not 
be able to defend the world from absurdity. It is better to think about 
participation in a way shortly presented by Antony Kenny: „To partici-
pate, Aquinas tells us, is to have a share of ”38. Creatures participate in 
being – they have a share of divinity. Kenny says: „So they do not lack 
being, as such; they are not nonentities”39. The concept of participation 
is a praise for being, not a complaint about its organisation and limita-
tion. For Thomas, the world of creatures is not imperfect, badly-con-
structed and always-lacking, but it is a world of beings who participate 
in actuality, perfection and thus divinity.
To make this inversion of thinking more understandable, at this 
point I would like to make a short remark using a quotation from Em-
erich Coreth: „Nicht die Wirklichkeit setzt Möglichkeit voraus, sondern 
Möglichkeit setz Wirklichkeit voraus” 40. So, it is not reality that presup-
poses possibility, but it is possibility that presupposes reality. It seems 
that the realistic („actualistic”) view allows us to understand Saint 
Thomas’ vision of the world better. From this standpoint it is advised 
to consider potentiality (which seems the most troublesome and prob-
lematic) from the perspective of actuality. From this viewpoint there 
only exists what is actual, while potentiality serves just as a figure that 
helps us to explain the reorganisation of the world’s appearance. That is 
why change alone is not a desperate run of absurdity, but a way of talk-
ing about the world that we try to understand. The permanent change 
38 A. Kenny, Aquinas on Being, Oxford 2002, p. 78.
39 Ibid., p. 188.
40 E. Coreth, Grundriss der Metaphysik, Innsbruck–Wien 1994, p. 83f.
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of creatures is a sign of the world’s multiplicity, variety and richness, not 
the proof of its absurdity.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented elegant proofs of corporeal crea-
tures’ perpetual change, unactualisability and imperfection which are in 
accord with Aquinas’ philosophy. These three things are logical conse-
quences of the definitions of change and corporeal creatures. Some phi-
losophers could claim that such an organisation of the world introduces 
absurdity. A proposal of a solution to this problem has been presented 
in the shape of Aquinas’ concept of participation. 
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